The decisive variable for the regime's survival is not street protests — it depends on IRGC loyalty, clerical alignment, and whether the US intervenes. Three scenarios examined.
The Iran protests, which sparked in late December 2025, continue on a volatile trajectory. The US has threatened military intervention in the event of a crackdown on protestors — which has already reportedly taken place, with at least 490 protestors killed to date. While President Trump has yet to decide on response options, he has already announced a 25% tariff on countries trading with Iran. This is likely to further suffocate the Iranian economy and narrow the regime's already-limited options to contain the situation.
US intervention could take various forms ranging from strikes on security organs, targeted attacks on regime figures, cyber operations, or expanded sanctions aimed at crippling the economy. In a best-case scenario, the US may opt for symbolic or limited strikes to save face, while tacitly allowing the regime to crush the protests and restore internal control. In exchange, Iran could be pushed to strike a deal with the US, at the core of which would be Iran's nuclear program, which the US may seek to neutralize once and for all.
This is not the first time protests have erupted in Iran, as seen in 2009, 2017–2019, and 2022. The decisive variable for the regime's survival is not street protests — rather, it depends on IRGC's loyalty, alignment of clerical institutions, and business networks supporting the regime.
In addition to internal setbacks, external factors may also play a role in the fall of the regime. The Iranian regime as we know it today has lost key external pillars that bolstered its influence, presence, and deterrence in the region. This includes a severely weakened Hamas in Gaza, degraded Hezbollah in Lebanon, isolated Houthi in Yemen, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and waning Russian support. This is combined with unprecedented US threats of intervention tied to internal unrest in Iran — something that did not occur during previous protest waves.
In the scenario leading up to the fall of the Iranian regime, several questions must be considered. Most notably, who is the viable replacement? How would regional actors respond? Are we going to witness another Syria or Libya?
The collapse of the current regime could drive the country into chaos and instability in the short-medium term. In the absence of an organized and unified opposition among protestors, coupled with a controversial exile opposition such as Reza Pahlavi — questions remain over who could rule Iran during a transitional phase.
A power vacuum risks pushing Iran down a path similar to Syria or Libya, where civil wars erupted, hundreds of armed groups emerged, and regional and international powers intervened. One possible flashpoint could involve Iran's Kurdish minority coordinating with Kurdish actors in Syria, potentially with US backing — rolling the dice for the emergence of endless actors.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, potentially alongside Turkey, could form another axis aimed at preventing the re-emergence of a Shi'a Islamist regime. Meanwhile, Shi'a militias in Iraq could mobilize in support of a Shi'a political order in Iran. This would risk transforming Iran into a regionalized battlefield rather than a national revolution.
With or without the fall of the regime, the recent wave of protests — combined with US threats of intervention — constitutes a turning point for Iran and the region as a whole. The question is no longer whether the regional order will be disrupted, but how deeply, and who will be positioned to shape what comes next.
The decisive variable remains the IRGC. If it holds, the regime survives. If it fractures — either through internal divisions or external pressure — the consequences will extend far beyond Iran's borders, reshaping alliances, proxy networks, and the balance of power across the Middle East for years to come.